Geopolitics and Critical National Infrastructure

19 June 2026

By Stephen Hermanson

Even a year in geopolitics might be considered a long time. At the Chatham House London Conference on the 20 June 2025, I reported on considerations for private sector critical infrastructure. A year on, I’ve returned to reflect on what’s changed.

Part 1: Report from the Chatham House London Conference 2025 (20 June 2025)
Part 2: Reflections a year on

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Part 1: Report from the Chatham House London Conference 2025

By Stephen Hermanson

Si vis pacem, para bellum

This annual fixture is a good opportunity to take the pulse alongside others of a similar breed who are trying to chart and navigate the security threats stemming from geopolitical tension. As ever, a stellar line up and credit to Chatham House for a solid event in the unexpected heat atypical of the British summer.

I stepped away reflecting mostly on the second plenary; Middle Powers: Reforming or remaking the Global Order? The panel presented a convincing case for the emerging role of Middle Powers (also recognising the definition of Middle Powers is varied and contested). On stage the representatives seemed aligned and capable. However, how does this pan out in reality where, for example, the G7 continue to pursue their interests, deals and spheres of influence.

Who would be ready to act as referee and enforce the rules-based order the Middle Powers have in mind? The new concept for the Global Order extolled by Middle Powers (and a central pillar of China’s narrative and message to this camp) is self-determination for nations and a voice at the table (including setting the menu and eating the food as Ambassador Dino Patti Djalal expressed it).

Middle Powers argue that the G7 lacks the capacity to find a consensus on the future Global Order, and Middle Powers have their own agency and can find a way through. I’m uncertain how this plays out with a G7 that’s wrestling with itself and others, potentially brushing aside the beginnings of a Middle Powers consensus and momentum.

I couldn’t quite identify from the Middle Powers the appetite (political will) and resources (economic trade-offs) to see their vision of a Global Order prevail in competition with the G7, and to intervene to enforce their rules-based order when competition for resources and standards of living brings states into conflict. Put bluntly, I’m not convinced that Middle Powers would mobilise 3% of combined GDP to invest in Defence in a way that would allow them to prosecute a war against aggressors to the Global Order; least of all any of the G7.

For the UK we heard that society has to recognise the quid-pro-quo necessary for the investments required to implement the insurance policy of the Strategic Defence Review. Middle Powers will have to do the same in my mind. Perhaps they are, and that’s commendable. The hard truth however (usefully articulated by Lt Gen Ben Hodges in the third plenary), is that many, including the UK and Europe, have done little to evidence the ability to prosecute a war to enforce the Global Order since the Second World War.

For consensus to hold and the possibility of a clear signal to aggressors (covert or overt) it seems to me we should dust off the old adage – si vis pacem, para bellum. War is already upon us according to many. Diplomacy will play a part of course and the Corporate world has a role too. Let’s make it count.

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Part 2: Reflections a Year On

By Stephen Hermanson

Action this day

It’s clear, a year on, that Middle Powers are struggling to make sustained investments in Defence and Security that exceed 3% of GDP (at least in the near to medium term). The private sector is investing in security too, although I’m yet to locate reliable numbers on the level of private sector investment in security as a percentage of market capitalisation – hoping this might offer a gauge to assess the relative scale of private and public sector investments. It seems to me these investments (public and private) ought to be co-ordinated and prioritised to prove and scale the best solutions in a timely way, especially amongst the Middle Powers that we hear must work together for the benefit of a future global order.

Take the UK, for example; a Middle Power by most definitions but, also a G7 (and UN Security Council) member. This speaks to the broad definition of Middle Power and therefore the increased challenge of co-ordinating a consensus from a larger group of diverse members which themselves, the UK included, are wrestling with internal political and funding challenges.

Recent comments by high profile figures such as ex-NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and General Sir Richard Barrons, are sobering evidence that the UK Strategic Defence Review has not precipitated the transformation required despite the passage of a year. The subsequent resignations of the UK Defence Secretary and Armed Forces Minister add to the sense of unease.

The MoD seems to be mounting a concerted defence of its programme to bring forward vital investments in areas such as drones. The private sector is investing heavily too, and here I’m sensing a potential gap in public-private co-ordination of investments to decide on the capabilities required and plans to scale and operationalise new technologies.

The market is being trusted to surface the best solutions, which is fine but, are we confident the required capabilities will emerge in time? From where we’re stood now, it’s difficult to be entirely confident but, nor am I noticing a meaningful consensus on industrial policy amongst Middle Powers. In the UK, whilst we await the Defence Investment Plan and Defence Readiness Bill, the UK Research, Development & Innovation strategy will need to do a lot of the lifting.

Winston Churchill’s “ACTION THIS DAY” label is one of the more enduring symbols of the Second World War. The labels were prepared by his staff and applied as part of office procedure, though the underlying impulse – his personal insistence on speed and his low tolerance for delay – will have given rise to a system that could cut through bureaucracy and hierarchy. It certainly feels like the same urgency and directness is needed now to bring Defence investment, in the UK at least, to where it needs to be.